Abstract: Innovation networks have become a persistent organisational phenomenon in industrial innovation processes. However, in economics they were considered in the first place only as a temporary phenomenon between markets and a hierarchical organisation within a single firm. The main focus of traditional neo-classical analysis simply was on cost reduction of R&D within a network. Only with the coming up of evolutionary economics with its prevailing knowledge orientation also learning and synergistic partnering move in the centre of interest. Without a consideration of the roles true uncertainty, heterogeneity as well as the historical character of time play in innovation, networks cannot be explained as a selforganisational persistent phenomenon. The present paper wants to bring together different strands of the new theory of innovation and develop an evolutionary theory of innovation networks.
Introduction
Modern technical solutions are characterised by an increased interrelatedness between heterogeneous actors and knowledge fields. No single firm can keep pace with the development of all relevant technologies. Therefore, firms seek access to external knowledge sources. In this respect innovation networks have gained significant importance as a mean of co-ordination of industrial research and development (R&D) processes.
Although in economics the impact of technological change on economic development, progress and growth was always widely recognised, no detailed study of the emergence and diffusion of innovation not to mention innovation networks were performed. Even economists as Joseph A. Schumpeter, who puts innovation in the centre of his theory of economic development of 1912, in the first place attributed innovative success just to the specific feature entrepreneurship of outstanding individuals in an economy. Almost 30 years later Schumpeter (1942) inspired by the development of the US-American industries identifies a significant change in the organisation of R&D processes in the specialised R&D laboratories of large firms (routinized innovation). And another 40 years later, again a significant change has taken place in the organisation of R&D. This change manifests in the interaction between these R&D labs and the other innovative actors as universities and other public research institutes, namely innovation networks. Nevertheless, it took until the end of the 80s and the beginning of the 90s until a certain interest in the theoretical explanation of this phenomenon awakened in economics.
An important reason for the late interest in and the problems with the investigation of networks and specifically innovation networks can be seen in the difficulties the theory of the firm poses for economists (see e.g. Holmstrom/Tirole (1988) ). Here, the questions "why do firms exist?" and "what are their boundaries?" are analysed and controversially discussed.
Sidney Winter (1991, p. 179) , reflecting on this problem, has to admit that the present state of the art is characterised by incoherence and contradictions.
In an economy without firms, a specific industrial sector would consist simply of isolated labour sharing individuals connected by markets. Only the bundling and organisation of several activities within a firm gives this branch its specific structure (e.g. small and medium-sized firms, large enterprises etc.). However, not only firms, but on a higher level also networks between them (and other involved actors) are a decisive feature of the industrial patterns we are observing. In the theory of the firm three different approaches exist, which are also used for the explanation of networks and are suitable to different degrees to explain the observed structures. In a way, in these approaches networks are seen either as a mean to minimise R&D costs, or as a mean to minimise transaction costs, or as a mean to create novelties.
In the first approach the firm is seen as a functional relationship between inputs and outputs of production. This production function approach also constitutes the basis for mainstream neoclassical economics. Accordingly, the questions posed are those on the optimality in the allocation of resources and the respective incentives of firm behaviour. With respect to industrial innovation processes since the early 80s a specific branch of literature (new industrial economics) also analyses the conditions and incentives of firms to engage in R&D co-operation by drawing on a game theoretic framework.
The second approach can be traced back to Ronald Coase (1937) and does no longer focus on immediate production processes but on transactions of economic processes. For Coase and his followers the main reason for the existence of firms are costs which arise by using the price mechanism of markets. Therefore, firms come into being because the costs of co-ordinating the transactions via markets are higher than the costs of a hierarchical organisation within a firm, in other words, there are incentives for cost saving. These considerations where later transferred on networks by Oliver Williamson (1975) and others. In this perspective, networks are an intermediate co-ordination form between the originally supposed dichotomy of hierarchy and markets.
The third strand of literature, the knowledge-based approach, differs sharply from these incentive-based approaches. Early proponents of this theory are Alfred Marshall (1920) who recognises knowledge as the decisive fact in production and Edith Penrose (1959) who identifies the knowledge base of a firm as its main characteristic. In the early 80s this approach is taken up by evolutionary economics. Here, the role of knowledge for economic development and the success of firms is explicitly recognised and constitutes the cornerstone of economic analysis. In the evolutionary perspective networks are seen as a central determinant in the industrial creation of novelty, and are therefore a decisive co-ordination mechanism. In networks new technological opportunities are created via technological complementarities and synergies by bringing together different technological and economic competencies.
In the following sections first the incentive-based approaches of explaining networks are discussed, before the knowledge-based approach of evolutionary economics is introduced in more detail. Finally, the different forms of innovation networks and the expectations with and advantages of this mode of industrial co-ordination are discussed.
The Incentive-Based Approaches
The transactions costs approach and the production function approach of neo-classical new industrial economics both draw on a marginalist perspective by comparing the marginal costs and benefits of different alternatives. As chronologically the transaction costs theory offers an earlier explanation of economic and innovation networks we start with this branch of literature.
Transaction Costs Analysis
According to the prevailing theories of industrial organisation up to the 80s the phenomenon of innovation networks was a surprising stylised fact. These theories predict that transactions would occur either in markets or in hierarchically structured organisations, i.e. firms. It was Williamson (1975) who introduced a theoretical explanation in terms of transaction costs, which explains that growing firms move increasingly away from an atomistic competition thereby internalising the different functions and stages of production which are characterised by a high degree of uncertainty and/or specificity of assets. In these cases, bounded rationality and opportunistic behaviour necessitates an integration of the respective functions within the firms. An institutional configuration aiming at an organisation in networks, in the first place was seen as unstable and inefficient because of incurring higher transaction costs. However, with this approach the growing frequency of collaborative networks in industrial reality was not explainable. To resolve the problems two answers are possible.
1 Either networks are not more than a temporary deviation from normal behaviour (markets or hierarchies) which do not last long or, networks present an additional form of industrial organisation, thereby adding a new alternative to the supposed dichotomy of markets and hierarchy. In his 1985 book Williamson admit to the latter: "Whereas I was earlier of the view that transactions of the middle kind were very difficult to organise and hence were unstable, on which account the bimodal distribution was more accurately descriptive (Williamson, 1975) , I'm now persuaded that transactions in the middle range are much more common."
According to this view, firms are assumed to engage in co-operative relationships in order to minimise their transaction costs.
By this, transaction costs economics is now drawing on a kind of a continuum of possible coordination mechanisms with pure market transaction on one end of the spectrum and the hierarchically organised firm on the other. In between these two extremes so-called hybrid forms are located. Which specific organisational form is chosen depends on the frequency of transactions, the importance of asset specificity as well as on uncertainty and opportunism. In this continuum perspective, one can move from the market pole, where all necessary information is captured by market prices, towards putting-out systems, different kinds of repeated exchange, and sub-contracting arrangements. Contractual relationships, either joint ventures or networks are located close to the hierarchy pole.
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With respect to the analysis of innovation networks the following points are of crucial importance within transaction costs economics: 3 system interdependence, indivisibilities, asset specificity, tacitness of knowledge, market and technological uncertainties, and inappropriability. With respect to the last two points figure 1 shows exemplary the way transaction costs economics deals with innovation networks. fig. 1 ). Therefore, the criticism as well as further developments of the transaction costs approach concentrate on the assumption of opportunistic behaviour which does not allow to develop something like mutual trust in a cooperative relationship. In this light, any kind of control mechanism in a network of firms is considered as detrimental to innovation (Mytelka, 1991) . Nooteboom (1999) in his dynamic transaction costs approach, where he is also introducing elements of evolutionary economics (see below), therefore, correctly states, that in a dynamic perspective firms have to consider their reputation as a reliable partner in an industry. Opportunistic behaviour would lead to a significant bad reputation isolating a firm more and more in the course of time.
New Industrial Economics
In the field of New Industrial Economics since the early 80s co-operation in innovation moved innovation and competition is analysed on two-or more-staged games comparing situations of pure competition in markets and hierarchies, with collaboration only in R&D, and collaboration in R&D as well as on the markets. According to these models collaboration in R&D seems to improve the performance of firms as well as social welfare in situations where technological appropriability is low and technological spillovers reduce the incentives of firms to invest in costly R&D processes. Therefore, co-operative R&D is considered as a mean to restore reduced R&D incentives due to low appropriability.
Another strand of literature immediately deals with co-operative know-how exchange as a possible explanation of the empirically phenomenon of imperfect appropriability conditions i.e. technological spillovers despite of appropriability means as patents, secrecy etc. The authors also draw on game-theoretic models, in particular on the class of behavioural cooperative games. Von Hippel (1989) and Schrader (1989) invoke the classical PrisonerDilemma to model the empirical phenomenon of free know-how exchange between firms which they labelled informal know-how trading.
Von Hippel (1989, p. 158) motivates his approach as follows: ″When required know-how is not available in-house, an engineer typically cannot find what he needs in publications either:
Much is very specialised and not published anywhere. He must either develop it himself or learn what he needs to know by talking to other specialists. Since in-house development can be time-consuming and expensive, there can be a high incentive to seek the needed information from professional colleagues. And often, logically enough, engineers in firms which make similar products or use similar processes are the people most likely to have the needed information.″ And indeed he finds informal know-how exchange to be wide-spread in the sectors he is investigating. ″An engineer at an aerospace firm was having trouble manufacturing a part from a novel composite material with needed precision. He called a professional colleague he knew at a rival firm and asked for advice. As it happens, that competitor had solved the problem by experimenting and developing some process-know-how involving mold design and processing temperatures, and the colleague willingly passed along this information″ (Von Hippel (1989, p. 168) ).
Within the game-theoretic framework the authors are able to show that under certain circumstances informal know-exchange could become a Nash-equilibrium if the game is repeated infinitely. By drawing on the work of Schelling (1973) other authors (Foray (1995) , Pyka (1999) ) show that similar results can be expected when more than two players are engaged in this game, thereby transferring the results of bi-lateral co-operation on multi-lateral cases.
The Knowledge-Based Approaches
In the following sections first the traditional approaches are criticised and building on this, the knowledge-based perspective of innovation processes is introduced. Finally, the significance and consequences of this evolutionary perspective for the investigation of innovation networks are stressed.
Criticism on the Traditional Theories
Both the neo-classical approach of new industrial economics and transaction costs analysis are controversially discussed according to what they can contribute to the analysis of innovation networks. Mainly out of this criticism more recent approaches draw on a knowledge-based foundation in their lines of reasoning. Here, the future benefits from the synergetic creation of knowledge through interaction within heterogeneous actors, dynamic technological accumulation and learning are seen as the major issues of networks in innovation processes.
Whereas the criticism on the transaction cost theory focuses on a significant shortcoming of this approach, namely the neglect of these technological complementarities, the criticism on the models of new industrial economics aims at the basic assumptions underlying this theory, which are in a fundamentally invariance with innovation processes.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss in detail the criticism made by evolutionary economics with respect to assumptions underlying the neo-classical reasoning. 5 For our purposes it is sufficient to mention three major points, evolutionary economists claim to be of outstanding importance in the discussion of economic development processes and which are incompatible with neo-classical theory. First of all, evolutionary theory wants to explain how novelties emerge and diffuse. A specific characteristic in these processes is uncertainty, which cannot be treated adequately by drawing on stochastically distributions referring to the concept of risk. Therefore, the assumption of perfect rationality, underlying neo-classical models cannot be maintained, instead the concepts of bounded and procedural rationality are invoked. Consequently, actors in evolutionary models are characterised by incomplete knowledge bases and capabilities. Closely connected, the second point concerns the important role heterogeneity and variety plays in development processes. Due to the assumption of perfect rationality, in neo-classical models usually homogeneous actors and technologies are analysed. Heterogeneity as a source of novelty is by and large neglected, or treated as an only temporary deviation. Finally, the third point deals with the time dimension in which learning and the emergence of novelties take place. By their very nature, these processes are truly dynamic, meaning that they occur in historical time. The possibility of irreversibility, however, does not exist in the mainstream approaches, relying on linearity and equilibrium.
As we will see below, these critical points emphasised by the knowledge-based approach, constitute the basis for an innovation process, characterised as an evolutionary development.
With respect to the criticism on the transaction cost approaches for analysing innovation networks there exists a quite heterogeneous literature, which, however, as a common basis,
show a considerable dissatisfaction with the market/hierarchy dichotomy placing networks simply as an intermediate case between the two extremes. According to this strand of literature (e.g. Chesnais (1996) , Foray (1991)) networking should not be explained primarily in terms of transaction costs, but should rather be examined in terms of strategic behaviour, appropriability and technological complementarity. This criticism can be traced back already to Richardson (1972) , who states that " ... firms are not islands of planned co-ordination in a sea of market relations but are linked together in patterns of co-operation and affiliation.
Planned co-ordination does not stop at the frontiers of the individual firm but can be affected through co-operation between firms. The dichotomy between firm and market, between directed and spontaneous co-ordination is misleading; it ignores the institutional fact of interfirm co-operation and assumes away the distinct method of co-ordination this can provide."
The crucial problem of traditional transaction costs analysis is the interpretation of organisational dynamics in terms of marginal costs. 6 By focusing on transaction costs only, as a consequence of the marginalist perspective adopted, an (implicit) perfect substitutability between internal and external knowledge sources is assumed. In this light, the characteristic 6 See Foray (1991), p. 395.
features of innovation processes like true uncertainty, variety and irreversibility are totally ignored.
Thus, the incentive-based approaches, with their focus on cost-based and rational decisions, are excluding crucial aspects of firms' strategies, which are influenced by a couple of factors lying by their very nature beyond the scope of these approaches. Also, of course cost-benefit calculations (with respect to innovation itself a problematic activity) play an important role, the firms' behaviour is influenced additionally by several other factors as learning, individual and collective motivation, mutual trust etc. It is the role of these factors the knowledge-based approach of evolutionary economics explicitly takes into account.
Innovation Processes in a Knowledge-Based Perspective
By switching from the incentive-based perspective to the knowledge-based perspective the evolutionary approaches have realised a decisive change in the analysis of innovation processes. In this light innovation processes mutate from optimal cost-benefit considerations to collective experimental and problem solving processes (Dosi (1988) ). The knowledge-base of a firm is no longer perfect, instead a gap between the competencies of a firm and difficulties which are to be mastered opens up (C-D gap, Heiner (1983) ). There are two reasons responsible for this C-D gap in innovation processes: on the one hand, technological uncertainty introduces errors and surprises in firm behaviour. On the other hand, the very nature of technological knowledge avoids an unrestricted access. Knowledge in general, and new technological know-how in particular, are no longer considered as freely available, but as local (technology specific), tacit (firm specific), and complex (based on a variety of technology and scientific fields). To understand and use the respective know-how specific competencies are necessary, which have to be built up in a cumulative process in the course of time.
Thus, the technological opportunity space is restricted by the specific competencies bundled within a firm. "It is clear that this opportunity will be restricted to the extent a firm does not see opportunities for expansion, is unwilling to react upon them, or is unable to respond to them" (Penrose (1959), p. 32). Moreover, despite the possibility to exploit the technological opportunities of a specific technology in the case of mastering the necessary competencies, this opportunity space is not unrestricted, but cumulatively depleted, i.e. further progress along this specific technological trajectory (Dosi (1982) ) becomes increasingly difficult to achieve due to technological bottlenecks and scientific restrictions. This, however, does not imply that progress comes to rest whenever these specific opportunities are depleted. (Mokyr (1990) , Kodama (1992) ) are identified.
It is obvious that a so characterised innovation process demands certain prerequisites to be fulfilled, if a firm wants to participate successfully. Due to the increased complexity of modern innovation processes a firm has to master a great number of different knowledge fields. In order to have the necessary access to external knowledge sources, firms, besides their specific competencies, have to provide for an additional broad knowledge base, the socalled absorptive capacity (Cohen/Levinthal (1989) , Cantner/Pyka (1998)) or receiver competence (Eliasson (1990) ) which allows them to flexibly react on external developments and external knowledge. Malerba (1992) states in this respect: "This complexity has meant that multidisciplinary knowledge has become necessary for the generation and development of new products. In the computer industry, for example, the disciplines involved in the innovation process may range from solid state physics to mathematics, and from language theory to management science." So-called go-it-alone strategies or conservative strategies which mean that a firm relies only on its own R&D endeavours, cannot be successful in such a complex environment. Because of the systemic character 7 of present-day technological solutions, technological development necessarily becomes a complex interactive process involving many different ideas, and their specific interrelationships.
Innovation Networks in the Knowledge-Based Approach
Obviously, the above characterisation of innovation processes has significant impacts on the analysis of innovation networks. These networks need to be understood not only in terms of transaction costs considerations, but also in the terms of learning, path dependencies, technological opportunities, and complementary assets. 8 Networks do not only influence the co-ordination of resources but also insert a significant impact on their creation. This has to be seen in a twofold perspective: First, the pooling of different competencies in the network of firms of course enhances this process of resource creation by exploiting complementary effects. However, additionally, the co-operation in networks also creates a real surplus or synergy in this process (Brousseau (1993) ).
How can networks influence and contribute to the process of organisational learning?
Drawing on the above features of technological knowledge (tacit, local and complex) it becomes clear, that know-how characterised this way cannot be exchanged via markets (even if the 'right' incentives exist). Without a common knowledge base and shared experience a simple know-how transfer is not possible. What is required here, is the common development of this kind of knowledge. "In this light networks represent a mechanism for innovation diffusion through collaboration and the interactive relationship becomes not only a coordination device to create resources, but an essential enabling factor of technical progress" (Zuscovitch/Justman (1995) ). Here it is not enough just to know what others are doing, but the firms also need to know how the respective technologies function and work together. And to support this inter-firm learning of often long-range cumulative, tacit and local know-how a stable and long lasting collaborative environment is necessary. 9 Clark and Juma (1987) introduce the notion evolutionary articulation, characterised by an essentially resonating feature: "In order to achieve the status of useful knowledge it [the information] needs to undergo a process of evolutionary articulation between supplier and recipient."
In transaction costs analysis so-called asset specificities are considered as a reason for a nonmarket co-ordination e.g. in innovation networks or in a hierarchical organisation. The Besides this creation of new so-called extensive opportunities (Coombs (1988) ) which constitutes the synergetic or surplus effect of innovation networks, above also the complementary effects were mentioned. In this respect, it is helpful to recall that the variety of assets and competencies which a firm needs access to in order to successfully commercialise a new technology is likely to be quite large even for only modest complex technologies. 11 Here, innovation networks show to be a promising alternative co-ordination mechanism which allows firm to have access to the complementary assets, which otherwise have to be build up alone -an extremely expansive and time-consuming endeavour, confronting at least small and medium seized firms with often insurmountable difficulties. 12 "Successful innovation requires complex forms of business organisation. Innovating organisations must form linkages to others, upstream and downstream, lateral and horizontal. Advanced technological systems do not, and cannot, get created in splendid isolation. The communication and co-ordination requirements are often stupendous, and in practice the price system alone does not suffice to achieve the necessary co-ordination" (Teece (1986) , p. 416). Innovation networks represent such a flexible organisational device.
10 See e.g. Imai/Itami (1984) . 11 Teece (1986) . 12 This is also stressed by Mowery (1991) : "Technological developments in a number of industries also have increased the importance of access to new or unfamiliar technologies ... Collaboration can provide more rapid access to technological capabilities that are not well developed within a firm and whose development may require large investment and considerable times."
To summarise, within the knowledge-based approach innovation networks thus are considered to have three major implications: First, they are seen as an important co-ordination device enabling and supporting inter-firm learning by accelerating and supporting the diffusion of new technological know-how. Second, within innovation networks the exploitation of complementarities becomes possible, which is a crucial prerequisite to master modern technological solutions characterised by complexity and a multitude of involved knowledge fields. Thirdly, innovation networks constitute an organisational setting which opens the possibility of the exploration of synergies by the amalgamation of different technological competencies. By this, innovation processes are fed with new extensive technological opportunities, which otherwise would not exist, or whose existence would at least be delayed.
Functions and Forms of Innovation Networks
In this final section we first look at the motives underlying firms' behaviour in their decisions to participate in innovation networks. Secondly, the most important theoretical classifications of networks are briefly introduced.
Firms' Motives
We have seen that the knowledge-based approach is supposing quite different functions of innovation networks compared to the incentive-based approaches. Whereas the latter claims for a co-ordination of innovation processes in networks due to cost-considerations, the former emphasises knowledge creating attributes of innovation networks. With respect to the different functions it is revealing to ask for the motives of firms to share co-operative agreements in R&D. Hagedoorn/Schakenraad (1989) list the motives of firms participating in innovation networks which are discussed in literature.
In particular they mention the following six motives:
(i) the extremely high costs and risks of R&D in high tech industries;
(ii) quick pre-emption strategies on a world scale which are preferable despite a 'loss' of potential monopoly profit;
(iii) shortening of period between discovery and market introduction; 
Classifying Innovation Networks
Up to now, we discussed the different theoretical approaches to explain the existence and necessity of a network organisation in innovation processes. However, the specific forms of innovation networks were not yet the subject of this survey. This final section is dedicated to introduce the most prominent concepts of classifying innovation networks in the theoretical literature. In particular, we focus on (i) national and regional systems of innovation and (ii) formal and informal networks.
(i) national and regional systems of innovation
An important strand of literature focuses from a national angle on the institutional setting within which innovation processes and the specific interactions between the different actors involved take place. They coined the notions of national systems of innovation (Lundvall (1988) , Nelson (1993) ) and development blocs (Dahmén (1989) , Carlsson/Stankiewicz (1991) ). These scholars build on different theoretical foundations and accordingly focus on a variety of institutions, which may affect the industrial development processes in a single country. As a common basis, however, a national system of innovation can be understood as a system of structured interactions between agents who are involved in the process of generating technological progress. Their interaction is structured in the sense that relations are often repeated, and thus institutionalised, and in the sense that formal and informal institutions exert an important influence on innovative performance. 13 Within this framework, not only the role of industry firms, but also of public research institutions like universities etc. is acknowledged. This way, also the linear-sequential innovation process is substituted by a more realistic multi-linked concept of innovation processes (Forrest (1991) , Kline (1985) , Rothwell (1994) ).
Starting from empirical observations that the innovative capacity of regions are sharply differing, another strand of literature is focusing on so-called regional innovation systems (e.g. Camagni (1991) , Cooke/Morgan (1994) Wissenschaftsstadt Ulm and Emilia-Romangna to name but a few. Recent approaches to explain regional agglomeration advantages claim that it is the clustering of resources and capabilities which lead to regional technological spillovers which are the factor responsible for innovative and economic success of firms in these regions. On the one hand, the localised pattern of development spurs the process of collective learning, in the sense that new knowhow is diffusing faster, thereby enhancing the creative capacity of the firms and institutions in the region. On the other hand, also the dynamic uncertainty of innovation processes is reduced within the regional agglomeration, allowing the firms a better foundation of their strategic decisions.
(ii) formal and informal networks
The design of a specific innovation network can vary on a spectrum between formal contractual agreements and loosely coupled informal networks. Freeman (1991, p. 502 research corporations or (2) joint R&D agreements to (3) the contractual arranged exchange of R&D results, from financial engagement as (4) direct investment to (5) licensing of technology and (6) subcontracting, from common established (7) research associations, (8) participating government sponsored programs or (9) the building up of a common R&D infrastructure like data-banks etc. to (10) the informal exchange of know-how between firms in a network or the employed scientists and engineers.
In the recent literature informal networks increasingly move in centre of interest. 15 According to Freeman (1991) they play a role somewhat analogous to tacit knowledge within firms, so e.g. behind every formal network are usually various informal networks, giving it the breath of life. Meanwhile, the empirical evidence of this form of inter-firm-learning is underlined in several studies, to name but a few e.g. von Hippel (1989) , Jagger and Miles (1989) , Hakanson/Johanson (1988) , Malerba/Torisi (1992) . Again Freeman (1991, p. 500), by surveying the empirical literature states: ″Although rarely measured systematically, informal networks appeared to be most important. Multiple sources of information and pluralistic patterns of collaboration were the rule rather the exception.″ In this respect, following Hakansson (1989) , also a dynamic component exerts influence: with an increasing duration of formal R&D co-operative relationships, they mutate to informal relationships as mutual trust and confidence between the partners is built up. Formal contracts get increasingly displaced by more flexible informal relationships in the course of time. Accordingly, although the formal arrangements end e.g. after the successful development of a new product, the relationship between the firms or the employed engineers and scientists remains, offering an efficient channel for knowledge flows in the future.
Summary and Conclusions
The aim of this paper was to give an overview on the development of theoretical concepts in economics to investigate innovation networks. Drawing as a starting point on the theory of the firm it is obvious that the analysis of innovation networks is confronted with the same obstacles as economic innovation theory in general.
14 See Camagni (1991) . 15 E.g. Pyka (1997) models the emergence of informal networks within a self-organisation framework.
The difficulties can mainly be traced back to the incentive-based perspective of traditional approaches. Both the production function approach of neo-classical economics as well as transaction costs analysis view innovation networks from a too narrow incentive-based perspective. Because of neglecting basic features of innovation processes and focusing on a cost-perspective only, these approaches do not catch the essential features of present day innovation networks.
Without drawing on the knowledge-based perspective of evolutionary economics, the crucial characteristics of innovation networks i.e. inter-firm learning, the exploitation of complementarities, and the creation of synergies cannot be captured. This knowledge-based perspective is supported by the motives the firms cause participating in innovation networks.
Here, firms regularly state synergistic partnering as the reason for their engagement in cooperation.
Finally, the main concepts are introduced, on which modern economic innovation theory draws upon in the analysis of innovation networks. However, up to now, there exists no clear terminology and several almost similar concepts are competing for their diffusion in literature.
Therefore, on the research agenda of evolutionary economics has to be the development of a common framework in the analysis of innovation networks which is also well suited for empirical investigations. The present paper wants to be a first step in this direction.
